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Abstract. We propose an algorithm for computing approximate Nash
equilibria of partially observable games using Monte-Carlo tree search
based on recent bandit methods. We obtain experimental results for the
game of phantom tic-tac-toe, showing that strong strategies can be effi-
ciently computed by our algorithm.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we introduce a method for computing Nash equilibria in partially
observable games with large state-space. Partially observable games - also called
games with incomplete information - are games where players know the rules
but cannot fully see the actions of other players and the real state of the game,
e.g. card games. Among these games, a classical testbed for computer algo-
rithms are phantom games, the most well known being Kriegspiel [11], and com-
puter scientists often consider phantom-go [5]. We here focus on a simpler game,
namely phantom tic-tac-toe, which is still unsolved; our algorithm is nonetheless
a generic tool for partially observable games.
The game of phantom tic-tac-toe (a.k.a. noughts and crosses) is played on
a 3 × 3 grid. The players take turns, respectively marking with “X” and “O”
the squares of the grid, and the first player to obtain three of his marks in an
horizontal, vertical or diagonal row wins the game. The difference between the
standard and the phantom game is that in the latter, players do not see where
their opponent plays. If they try to play in an “illegal” square, then they are
informed of this fact and must play somewhere else. Playing such an illegal move
is never harmful since it brings information about the real state of the game,
and good strategies will use this.
The game of phantom tic-tac-toe, as well as numerous other games like chess,
go or poker, can be modelled in the so called extensive form, which is given by
a tree where nodes correspond to the different positions of the game, and arcs
to the decisions of players (see e.g. [9]). In the partial observation case, we must
add to this framework information sets grouping nodes that a player cannot
distinguish.
When the game has full observability, Monte-Carlo tree search [8] (MCTS
for short) is known as a very efficient tool for computing strong strategies. Let
us describe briefly how such an algorithm works. The algorithm grows a subtree
T1 of the whole tree of the game T . For each new round, the algorithm simulates
a single play by moving in the tree T down from the root. The tree T does not
have to be stored, but is implicitly given by the rules of the game. For each node
of T where some player has to make a decision, two case may happen:
− either the node is in T1, and then a decision is made according to information
stored in this node;
− either the node is not in T1, and a move is randomly chosen, generally with
uniform probability.
When the simulation ends, either by a player’s victory or a draw, the first
encountered node of T which is not in T1 is added to T1, and in this node up to
the root, informations concerning the last simulation are processed (usually, the
number of simulations and victories where these nodes were encountered).
The policy used to choose in T1 between different actions in a given node is
based on the past wins and losses during previous simulations; this is what we
call a bandit method. Such a method, EXP3, is described in the next section.
One of the strengths of MCTS algorithms is that the tree T1 which is built is
asymmetric: some branches of T , consisting of nearly-optimal actions for both
players, will be explored repeatedly, but in the long run the whole tree T will be
explored.
A difficulty for the adaptation of these algorithms to the partially observable
case is that when a player has to choose his next action, he has to guess someway
the unknown moves of his opponent. A standard method is to use a probability
distribution on the different possibilities of the opponent’s past moves in order
to estimate what will happen if an action is selected. This is what we call belief
sampling, and it has led to several implementations, using MCTS in a tree where
only one player has choices and the opponent moves are predicted by different
belief sampling methods [3,7,12].
These algorithms compute efficient strategies, but they are not intended to
compute solutions of the game, i.e. almost optimal strategies and Nash Equilib-
ria, which is here our goal.
On the other hand, a method named minimization of counterfactual regret
has been introduced in [13] to compute Nash equilibria for partially observable
games. However, as opposed to MCTS algorithms, this method has for each
round of computation to process the whole tree of the game, which is very long
in most cases.
We propose here an alternative method which is aimed at computing Nash
equilibria using MCTS algorithms. The method has the main advantages of
MCTS algorithms: it is consistent in the long run (convergence to a Nash Equi-
librium) but still efficient in the short term (asymmetry of the tree).
For the sake of conciseness we cannot develop further these notions apart from
the specific algorithms that we use and refer to [8,10] for a general introduction
to Monte-Carlo Tree Search and Upper Confidence Trees, and to [1,6] for bandit
methods.
2 The EXP3 Algorithm
This algorithm has been introduced in [2] ; additional information can be found
in [1]. We have the following framework:
1. At each time-step t ≥ 0, the player chooses a probability distribution on
actions {1, 2, · · · , k} ;
2. Informed of the distribution, the environment secretly chooses a reward vec-
tor (rt
1
, · · · , rtk) ;
3. An action It ∈ {1, · · · , k} is randomly chosen accordingly to the player’s
distribution, who then earns a reward rtIt .
The algorithm requires two parameters, γ ∈ [0; 1] and η ∈ (O; 1
k
], which have
to be tuned (more informations in [1]). Both parameters control the ratio between
exploitation of empirically good actions and the exploration of insufficiently
tested actions. If one uses the algorithmwith an infinite horizon, both parameters
have to decrease to 0.
Algorithm 1 EXP3 Algorithm
1: let p1 be the uniform distribution on {1, · · · , k}
2: for each round t = 1, 2, · · · do
3: choose randomly an action It according to pt ;
4: update the expected cumulative reward of It by
GIt = GIt +
rtIt
ptIt
5: update the probability p by setting for each i ∈ {1, · · · , k}
p
t+1
i = (1− γ)
exp(ηGi)∑k
j=1 exp(ηGj)
+ γ
6: end for
It can be proved that in a zero-summatrix game - which is defined by a matrix
A, where players respectively choose a row i and a column j by a distribution
probability, and where Ai,j is the corresponding reward for the first player (the
other player earning the opposite) - if both players update their probability
distributions with the EXP3 algorithm, then the empirical distributions of the
players’ choices converge almost surely to a Nash equilibrium.
3 Our algorithm: Multiple Monte-Carlo Tree Search with
EXP3 as a bandit tool
We consider here partially observable games in extensive form, which does not
necessarily mean that a tree is given, but rather are the rules of the game.
More precisely, we suppose the existence of a referee able to compute, given the
moves of each player, what is the new (secret) state of the game, and then sends
observations to the players.
All players will separately run a MCTS algorithm, growing a tree depending
on the other players’ strategies; thus the whole algorithm behaves similarly to
fictitious play [4]. The nodes of these trees correspond to the successive inter-
actions between players and the referee: moves of the player and observations.
For each new simulation (i.e. single game) a new node is added to the tree for
each player; during a game if a player has to move to a node which has not been
constructed yet, then he stores information about this node and from this point
plays randomly until the end of this game. At the end of the game, the node is
added and results of this game are processed from this node up to the root of
the tree.
We suppose for our implementation that the players have two different play-
ing modes:
− in tree mode, the player has in memory a current node corresponding to its
history of successive moves and observations during the play. Each of these
nodes have transitions corresponding to observations or moves, either leading
to another existing node or leaving the tree if such a transition has never
been considered. Players actualize their current node given the successive
moves and observations, and if a transition leaves the tree then the player
mode is set to out of the tree.
− in out of tree mode, players just play randomly with uniform probability on
all moves.
When a player is first set to out of the tree mode, a new node corresponding
to the simulation is added, which we indicate in the algorithm by first node
out of the tree.
Algorithm MMCTS requires two parameters that we now describe:
− a function γ, depending on the number of simulations n, which is a parameter
of the EXP3 algorithm used for mixing the exponentially weighted strategy
with an uniform distribution. It is mandatory to have γ tend to zero as the
number n of simulations goes to infinity, otherwise the empirical frequencies
would remain close to a uniform distribution. Experimentally we used γ(n) =
n−0.3 in the case of phantom tic-tac-toe.
− a function f , depending on the depth d of the nodes. This function is used
to reward much more a node of great depth than a node close to the root
for a good moves; the idea is that the success of a deep node is decisive,
whereas a node close to the root leads to a lot of different strategies and we
should be careful by not rewarding it to much for single success. We used
f(d) = 1.7d−9.
Clearly these parameters have to be tuned and our choices are empirical.
Algorithm 2 Multiple Monte-Carlo Tree Search with EXP3 policy for a Game
in Extensive Form
Require: a game G in extensive form
1: while (timeleft>0) do
2: set players to tree mode and their current node to the roots of their trees
3: repeat
4: determine active player i
get Player i’s move:
5: if Player i is tree mode then
6: choose randomly a move proportionally to the probabilities
p
i
m(N) = (1− γ(n))
rew(N,m)∑k(N)
ℓ=1 rew(N, ℓ)
+
γ(n)
k(N)
defined for all moves m = 1, · · · k(N) from Player i’s current node N .
7: else
8: choose randomly the next move with uniform probability.
9: end if
10: return to all players observations according to the previous move.
11: for each player j in tree mode do
12: determine the node N ′ following the current node according to the obser-
vation.
13: if node N ′ exists in memory then
14: let N ′ be the new current node of Player j
15: store the probability p(N ′) of the transition from N to N ′
16: else
17: store node N ′ as the first node out of the tree
18: set Player j in out of tree mode
19: end if
20: end for
21: until game over
22: for each player j do
23: let rj be the reward obtained during the last play
24: if Player j is in out of tree mode then
25: add to Player j’s tree the first node out of the tree
26: let N be this node
27: else
28: let N be the last node encountered during the last play
29: end if
30: while N 6= NULL do
31: update the reward of node N for the movem which was chosen in this node
rew(N,m)← rew(N,m) · exp
(
f(d)
rj
p(N)
)
where d is the depth of node N and p(N) is the probability of the transition
that led to node N during the last play.
32: do N ← father(N)
33: end while
34: end for
35: end while
4 Experimental results
We test our algorithm in the simple context of phantom tic-tac-toe. While being
simpler than other phantom games, the full tree of possible moves for a single
player is quite huge. Whereas the classic tic-tac-toe game is totally deterministic,
and known to end up with a draw if both players play optimally, in the phan-
tom case the partial observability leads the players to consider mixed strategies
for their moves. Thus it will not be surprising that if both players play opti-
mally, with a little luck both can win a single game. If both player play totally
randomly with uniform probabilities (which applies as well to the classic and
phantom settings), Player 1 wins 60 % of the matches and Player 2% about 30%
(thus 10% are draws) - see Table 1; thus clearly the game favors Player 1. The
strategy stealing argument shows that this is also the case in the phantom case
if both players play optimally. What is more surprising is that we obtain:
Experimental result The value of the game is approximatively 0.81.
We refer to classic textbooks in Game Theory (e.g. [9]) for the definition of
value of a zero-sum game or Nash equilibrium. Here the value is to be understood
with a score of +1 if Player 1 wins and a score of −1 if Player 2 wins (and 0 for
a draw). Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the number of wins of Player 1 and
Player 2 as the number of simulations grows.
In fact Player 1 can force about 85 % of victory whereas Player 2 can force
only about 4 % of victory. We now present some competitors that we designed
to test our algorithm. The results of repeated matches betweens these players
are given on Table 1.
The Random Player: plays every move randomly with uniform probability.
The Belief Sampler Player: this player uses belief sampling as described in
the introduction. He has in memory the full tree of classic observable tic-tac-
toe, and before each move considers all the possible sets of moves of the oppo-
nent that match the current state of observations, and stores optimal moves. It
then randomly decides a move proportionally to the frequencies obtained during
the previous simulation. This is a quite strong opponent: see the results of the
matches opposing Belief Sampler and Random Player on Table 1. However, the
results of matches Belief Sampler versus Belief Sampler are far from the value
of the game, and are exactly the same that we obtain if both players play at
random (Table 1).
The MMCTS Players: these are the players that we obtain after letting algo-
rithm MMCTS run for a given number of simulations. We chose these numbers
to be 500,000, 5 millions and 50 million simulations. Observe that as a first
player, only Belief Sampler can stand the pressure against MMCTS 50M but as
a second Player only the former resists against all opponents. For instance, it
appears that Belief Sampler is a better Player 2 against Random Player than
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Fig. 1. Probabilities of winning for Player 1, Player 2 and their difference ac-
cording to the number of simulations. The difference converges to the value of
the game 0.81 .
MMCTS 50M is, however MMCTS 50M always ensures a good proportion of
wins. Also observe that in MMCTS 50M versus Belief Sampler matches, our
player is much better.
Player 1 \ Player2 MMCTS 500K MMCTS 5M MMCTS 50M Random Belief Sampler
MMCTS 500K 65% \ 25% 51% \ 37% 44% \ 47% 67% \ 22% 40% \ 43%
MMCTS 5M 88% \ 06% 82% \ 10% 78% \ 17% 88% \ 05% 78% \ 10%
MMCTS 50M 93% \ 02% 89% \ 03% 85% \ 04% 93% \ 02% 82% \ 03%
Random 55% \ 33% 48% \ 39% 41% \ 47% 59% \ 28% 30% \ 53%
Belief Sampler 77% \ 14% 73% \ 18% 68% \ 22% 79% \ 12% 56% \ 28%
Table 1. Probability of winning a game for Player 1 \Player2.
Let us explain now why we pretend that the strategies of the MMCTS 50M
players are “approximatively optimal strategies”. By approximatively optimal,
we mean that the strategy behaves like a Nash equilibrium strategy - it ensures
a certain value - versus most opponent strategies. In order to compute really
optimal strategies, one would have to let the algorithm run for a very long time.
However, even with 50 Million simulations (which takes less than an hour on a
standard computer) the asymmetric trees that have been grown contain most of
the branches corresponding to high probability moves in a real Nash equilibrium.
Nevertheless, in the short term these strategies cannot be perfect, and branches
less explored can be used by opponents to build a strategy specifically designed
to beat our algorithm.
A way to test this is to fix the strategies obtained by our algorithm and
to have them compete with an opponent initialized as a random player and
evolving with a one-sided MCTS. At last the evolving opponent will be able to
spot weaknesses and exploit them. Hence a way to measure a player’s robustness
is to test whether he can stand in the long run when opposed to an evolving
opponent. We depict on Figures 2 and 3 the evolutions of the difference of wins for
Random Player, MMCTS 50M and Belief Sampler against an evolving opponent,
which is respectively the second and the first player on Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
We observe that as a first player (Fig. 2), MMCTS 50M resists in the long run
to all attacks from the evolving opponent, whereas Random Player and Belief
Sampler are defeated way below the value of the game (of course if we wait much
longer it will also be the case for MMCTS 50M); here the supremacy of MMCTS
50M is undeniable. As a second player (Fig. 3) its performance is less spectacular
and Belief Sampler seems to resist much better to the assaults of the evolving
opponent; however MMCTS does what it is built for, i.e. ensure the value of the
game regardless of the opponent.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we showed a way to adapt Monte-Carlo tree search algorithms
to the partially observable case in order to compute Nash equilibria of these
games. We proposed the MMCTS algorithm, which we used as an experimental
example in the case of phantom tic-tac-toe, obtaining strong players and the
approximative value of the game. In particular, the strength of our player was
proved by its resistance when fixed against an evolving player, and its good
results against one of the best players known for partially observable games, the
Belief Sampler Player. The experimental results being promising, we have several
directions for future research. First, we must obtain bounds on the convergence
of the algorithm to a Nash equilibrium, and find a way to rigorously define
the notion of “very good versus most strategies” that we described and tested.
Second, it will be necessary to implement the algorithm in a larger framework, for
instance for kriegspiel or poker. Finally, a problem still open is to how compute
optimal strategies with MCTS algorithms without starting from the root of the
tree but from any observed position: this seems to involve necessarily beliefs on
the real state of the game. How can one compute these beliefs without starting
from the root ? Progress has to be made with MCTS algorithms before solving
this question.
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